How should we read a text?

This is a question we need to spend more time on in class. There are multiple theories of interpretation, but an attractive one is "read the words as they are written." Sometimes that reinforces what the statute's drafter intended, sometimes it does not: should drafters' intentions matter? should the words be read broadly and loosely, like Marshall in McCulloch, or should words be given a more strict construction?

Two Supreme Court Cases decided today, February 28, raise this issue. Both involve reading statutes, and in both the Justices look beyond the words to what Congress may have intended.

In SCHEIDLER et al. v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., et al.,

Held: Physical violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside the Hobbs Act's scope. Congress did not intend to create a freestanding physical violence offense. It did intend to forbid acts or threats of physical violence in furtherance of a plan or purpose to engage in what the Act refers to as robbery or extortion (and related attempts or conspiracies). Pp. 5-11.

(a) The more restrictive reading of the statutory text--the one tying the prohibited violence to robbery or extortion--is correct.

Meanwhile, in TEXACO INC. v. DAGHER et al., the Court

Held: It is not per se illegal under §1 of the Sherman Act for a lawful, economically integrated joint venture to set the prices at which it sells its products. Although §1 prohibits "[e]very contract [or] combination ... in restraint of trade," 15 U. S. C. §1, this Court has not taken a literal approach to that language, recognizing, instead, that Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints,

The first case, with the narrow reading of the statute, meant that abortion clinic protestors could not be prosecuted under Hobbs Act / RICO. The second case meant that Exxon/ Shell price setting is not, per se, illegal.

Both cases were unanimous.

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